substance to sit between *κυνός* and *τριάνορος*: Helen is sex-mad in kind as well as in degree.

Cassandra's virginal modesty does not entirely debar the use of indecent terms: at v. 91, in calling Menelaus *πύγαργον*, 'white-arsed', that is to say a coward, she employs a word that Aeschylus had deemed beneath the tragic dignity;[22] at v. 148 *τριόρχας*, 'three-testicled', does not merely denote a species of buzzard but indicates sexual rapacity.[23] When a worse meaning is required, her language becomes less coarse: in vv. 1385–7 the wantonness of Neleus' daughter is veiled by the obscurity of *γλῶσσαι*:

> *ὅταν κόρη κασωρὶς εἰς ἐπείσιον*
> *χλεύην ὑλακτήσασα κηκάσῃ γάμους*
> *νυμφεῖα πρὸς κηλωστὰ καρβάνων τελεῖν.*
>
> When at her nakedness the lykerous maid
> Shall bark foul scorn, and fleer in wedlock's spite
> That she will find her mate in outland stews. (L.A.H.-S.)

Our passage conceals an even filthier sense beneath a word that at first appearance is harmless, and hardly even a reproach: *sermo uerbis tectus, re impudentior*. If this impudence requires more than normal erudition to disclose, all the more credit to the poet.

67 St Bernard's Road, Oxford LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS
holfordl@oup.co.uk; aulus@gellius.demon.co.uk

standpoint, is indicated by the phrase *ἀρσενόπαιδα Κύπριν*: the husband is to entertain the fiction that his wife is male, Cassandra emphasizes the fact that Helen is female.

[22] See Fraenkel on A. *Ag.* 115; to be sure Sophocles had used it *ἐπὶ τοῦ δειλοῦ* (fr. 1085 Radt), but who shall say it was not in a satyr-play?

[23] J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (New York, 1991[2]), 121 no. 49, 125 no. 74; Dunbar on Ar. *Av.* 1206, who compares Timaeus of Tauromenium 566 F 124b ap. Polyb. 12.15.2. We may excuse *'Ενόρχης* (212) as a cult-title.

MAHARBAL'S *BON MOT*: AUTHENTICITY AND SURVIVAL

Did the Carthaginian cavalry general Maharbal really urge Hannibal to march on Rome after Cannae, and then comment bitterly *Vincere scis, Hannibal; victoria uti nescis*, when his leader refused? There are two main objections: Maharbal may not have been there, and anyway Cannae was too far away to justify such a march. The whole story has been seen as one of those well-known Roman historiographical inventions. But there may well be more to the story than that, illuminating both Hannibalic history and some Roman historiographical techniques.[1]

[1] Livy 22.51.2–3 (as amended by Gronovius from a remarkably corrupt MSS tradition). Later versions: Valerius Maximus 9.5 ext. 3; Plutarch, *Fabius* 17; Silius Italicus 10.375–86; Florus 1.22.19–20; Dio in Zonaras 9.1.16; Ammianus 18.5.6. Disbelieved by W. Huss, *Geschichte der Karthager* (München, 1985), 332, n. 281; J. Seibert, *Hannibal* (Darmstadt, 1993), 198–9, cf. *Forschungen zu Hannibal* (Darmstadt, 1993), 232; J. Lazenby, in T. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin (edd.), *The Second Punic War. A Reappraisal* (London, 1996), 39. Suspicion avowed by G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, 3.2[2] (Firenze, 1968), 202–3; cf. J. Lazenby, *Hannibal's War. A Military History of the Second Punic War* (Warminster, 1978), 290, n. 47.

I

The sources are at odds over Maharbal at Cannae. While Livy has him as commander of the Punic right wing, Polybius has Hanno. Plutarch calls the giver of advice 'Barcas the Carthaginian'; Silius, perhaps reflecting the same tradition, offers Hannibal's own brother Mago (likewise a son of Hamilcar Barca). All the same Maharbal must have been present. For one thing he led part of Hannibal's unsuccessful assault on Casilinum later the same year. For another, Appian, who wants to have kinsmen of Hannibal in charge of the wings (brother Mago and nephew Hanno), acounts for Maharbal by giving him command of a reserve force of cavalry. Although Appian can be used only with great caution on these earlier Punic wars, here he may be right.[2]

But the distance problem remains. Cannae lies some 500 kilometres or 300 miles from Rome, and in between stand the rugged and extensive mountains of Samnium as well as the difficult uplands of Campania and Latium. Not only that—our Punic Murat tells Hannibal that the army can do it in five days:

Immo ut quid hac pugna sit actum scias, die quinto (inquit) victor in Capitolio epulaberis. Sequere; cum equite, ut prius venisse quam venturum sciant, praecedam.

This is plainly nonsensical: even if the army met no resistance and (improbably) felt no fatigue from the recent battle, it could not march a hundred kilometres a day.

Seibert also holds that Maharbal's promise—a feast on the Capitol (in Jupiter's temple), the culmination of a Roman triumphator's day of glory—had little meaning for a Carthaginian. For him too the tale 'verrät . . . die römische Erfindung'.[3]

II

The oldest versions of the story emphasize the five days (and the hot dinner). Cato the Elder in his *Origines* had it thus:

Igitur dictatorem Karthaginiensium magister equitum monuit: 'Mitte mecum Romam equitatum; diequinti in Capitolio tibi cena cocta erit.'

In that censorious historian's normal fashion, the commanders' personal names were left unmentioned. Late in the second century B.C. Coelius Antipater, in his monograph on the Second Punic War, elaborated on this version. Aulus Gellius gives us what Coelius' cavalry chief says:

Si vis mihi equitatum dare et ipse cum cetero exercitu me sequi, diequinti Romae in Capitolio curabo tibi cena sit cocta.

Coelius' more stylish version in turn looks like the one that Livy so memorably worked up.

Cato, a younger contemporary of Hannibal's, could have consulted pro-Carthaginian accounts like those of the general's friends Silenus and Sosylus when

[2] Wing commanders, left and right, at Cannae: Polybius 3.114.7 (Hasdrubal and Hanno); Livy 22.46.7 (Hasdrubal and Maharbal); Appian, *Hannibalica* 20.90 (Mago, Hannibal's brother, and Hanno who is termed Hannibal's nephew); Silius 9.220–34 (Nealces and Mago). Maharbal at Cannae, Appian, *Hann.* 20.91, 21.95; accepted by V. Ehrenberg, *RE* 14.523 s.v. 'Maharbal (2)'; at Casilinum, Livy 23.18.4. On Appian's *Hannibalica*, see C.G. Leidl in *Aufstieg u. Niedergang d. Röm. Welt*, part II, 34.1 (Berlin/New York, 1993), 428–62; B. D. Hoyos, *Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars* (Berlin/New York, 1998), 292–3.

[3] Seibert, *Hannibal* (n. 1), 199, n. 78, 'einen karthagischen Feldherrn konnte das [= mit Jupiter zu speisen] kaum verlockern.'

composing the later part of his *Origines*. He may also have spoken with Carthaginians—prisoners during the war, for instance, and former participants and envoys later. There were even Romans in a position to contribute information from the Punic side: L. Cincius Alimentus, praetor in 210, was captured a couple of years later and became well enough acquainted with Hannibal to hold conversations with him on military matters, which he later very properly made use of in his history of Rome (written in Greek). He need not have been the only Roman prisoner of war to make friends with his captors.[4]

Of course, even if Cato drew the story from a Punic source he wrote it up in a distinctively Latin manner: the alliteration and assonance hardly betoken a word-for-word translation, and what interests Gellius in quoting the extract is the old-fashioned word *diequinti*. But it would be a *non sequitur* to hold that because Cato gave the Carthaginian speaker's words a homely Latin cast, he must therefore have invented the episode itself. *Diequinti* itself argues against this: why should Cato specify any invented march-time? Moreover, having served in the Second Punic War and become a general himself, he would scarcely—if writing about the aftermath of Cannae—foist on his speaker an impossible invented timespan when *vicesimo die* (or the like) would have made more sense without spoiling the point.

It is equally unsafe to suppose that the mention of banqueting on the Capitol unmasks Roman fraud. If Hannibal's Carthaginians knew about Roman triumphal usages—and well they might, if only because so many triumphs had been celebrated *de Poenis* since 264—the notion of celebrating victory over the Romans in the heart of the Roman state according to Roman ceremonial could be a pleasingly ironic image. It need not even have been literally meant: the imagery was more or less equivalent to a colloquial English promise to 'present you with Rome on a plate'. Besides, a general's triumphant entry into a surrendered city could be marked by a victory banquet, just as it was at Capua a few weeks later when the town defected to Hannibal. The notion of him dining in the presence of Rome's defeated tutelary god was a conceit that a Carthaginian could relish.[5]

III

The crucial objection remains the mention of five days or, more precisely, 'on the fifth day'. Rather than simply disqualifying the story, *diequinti* prompts a look from a different angle. was Hannibal ever in a position after a great victory to reach Rome 'on the fifth day'?

The answer is, of course, yes: after Flaminius' army was annihilated at Trasimene. Maharbal was there too, for he commanded in two further actions just afterwards.[6]

[4] Cato, fr. 86 Peter = Gellius 10.24.7 (avoidance of personal names in narrating wars: Nepos, *Cato* 3.4; Pliny, *N.H.* 8.11); Coelius Antipater, fr. 25P (= Gellius, ibid.). On Livy's use of Coelius, cf. P. G. Walsh, *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge, 1963), 124–8, 130–2; T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of his History* (Princeton, 1977), 178–9. Silenus and Sosylus: Nepos, *Hann.* 13.4. Sosylus is mentioned by Polybius (3.20.5, along with an unknown Chaereas); his fragmentary account of a sea-battle, F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, no. 176 F1. cf. F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 1 (Oxford, 1957), 333; K. Meister, *Historische Kritik bei Polybios* (Wiesbaden, 1975), 167–71; on the pro-Carthaginian writers of the time, Seibert, *Forschungen* (n. 1), 11–14. Cincius Alimentus is cited by Livy (21.38.3) on Hannibal's army strength in 218; cf. Seibert, ibid., 16–17.

[5] Hannibal's *convivium* on his first afternoon at Capua: Livy 23.8.4–6.

[6] Maharbal's exploits after Trasimene: Pol. 3.84.14, 86.4–5; Livy 22.6.11, 8.1–4; other sources cited in Walbank (n. 4), 420–1.

Lake Trasimene lies about 135 kilometres (85 miles) north of Rome, just to the west of Perusia and the brand-new Via Flaminia built by Flaminius when censor in 220. Roman armies in the imperial age were supposed to march 20 *milia passuum* (about 30 kilometres) a day in summer, at any rate over level terrain and with regular rest-days. This would have made the journey through Etruria from Trasimene to Rome a reasonable five or six days.

Hannibal's army is not normally seen as able to move at such a rate. In ten days during the later stages of its advance to the Alps in 218 it covered only 800 *stadia* or some 142 kilometres, an average of only just over 14 kilometres a day—sometimes treated as its usual pace. Even if at least one of those ten days was a rest-day, the average daily rate of actual footslogging rises to less than 16 kilometres. Even without any rest it would have taken the Carthaginians something like eight and a half days to reach the city if that was all the speed they could make.[7]

But when it suited him Hannibal could move very fast. In 211, hoping to draw the Romans off from besieging Capua, he left his position near that town and moved on Rome so swiftly (in Polybius' account) that the residents there realized he was coming only when he was practically outside the walls. This may be exaggeration for dramatic impact, and Livy's more detailed, if controversial, account has the Romans aware of his departure from Capua first and of his destination only when he was much nearer. But all reports emphasize his speed in 211, and this was after seven hard years of war.[8]

Hannibal quite likely thought of advancing on Rome in 217. Polybius affirms that after Trasimene he decided against doing so 'for the time being'; and around the time of Trasimene a fleet from Carthage approached the Etruscan coast at Pisae hoping to link up with him, only to be disappointed. Seibert plausibly suggests that what had been planned was a joint thrust at Rome. The expected rendezvous must have been arranged well in advance, before Hannibal marched into Etruria. It would be no surprise if his officers too expected just such a thrust, after Flaminius' army and then the other consul Servilius' cavalry had been annihilated, and were taken aback when he decided otherwise.[9]

IV

But if Maharbal's advice was really spoken after Trasimene, how then was it attached to Cannae? It is not likely that Livy himself transferred it. In one form or other it was already well known, as its handling by Cato and Coelius shows, and if Livy's sources

[7] Roman army's marching-speed: Vegetius, *Epit. Rei Mil.* 1.9; D. Proctor, *Hannibal's March in History* (Oxford, 1971), 31–2; though A. K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War* (Oxford, 1996), 109–10, stresses that such rates were under optimum conditions only. Rest-days: Proctor, ibid. Hannibal's 800 *stadia* in ten days from 'The Island': Pol. 3.50.1. Walbank (n. 4), 388–9, and Huss (n. 1), 304, n. 70, are sceptical of the 10 days; Lazenby (n. 1), 35, 275, accepts them.

[8] Hannibal's march on Rome in 211: Pol. 9.5–7; Livy 26.7–11 (Coelius cited on the route, 26.11.10–12); Appian, *Hann.* 38.163–39.169; route much debated, for example by de Sanctis (n. 1), 3.2^2, 324–9; Walbank, *Hist. Comm. on Pol.* 2 (Oxford, 1967), 118–27, with map on 122; Lazenby (n. 1), 121–3; Seibert, *Forschungen* (n. 1), 238–41, and *Hannibal* (n. 1), 304–11. News of Hannibal's approach, Pol. 9.5.8–6.1; Livy 26.8.1, 9.6. For comparison, in winter 1805 a 6000-strong French division marched 140 kilometres, from Vienna to the army near Austerlitz, in fifty hours (thirty-five actually on the road): D. A. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (London, 1965, repr. 1993), 149, 420–1.

[9] Hannibal decided against moving on Rome κατὰ τὸ παρόν, Pol. 3.86.3; cf. Livy 22.9.1–3. Punic fleet off Pisae, Pol. 3.96.8–11; cf. Livy 22.11.6–7; on its date cf. de Sanctis (n. 1), 3.2^2, 232, n. 61; surmised purpose, Seibert, *Hannibal* (n. 1), 156, n. 91.

ascribed it to a different setting he had little ground for shifting it to Cannae. Much more likely, then, he found the connection with Cannae already made.

It is worth noting that Gellius gives no narrative context for his quotations. Just as Cato avoided naming his protagonists, he may not have narrated the anecdote in the context of a named battle but instead (for instance) to illustrate how the Punic *dictator* could win a battle yet lose the war. At all events, as shown above, he is unlikely to have placed the anecdote after Cannae.

Coelius, as author of a detailed history, would in turn wish to furnish more details even if he had to infer them for himself. There were other Carthaginian anecdotes about Cannae, presumably from Hannibal-historians like Silenus. For instance, Hannibal's joke to Gisco before the battle to reassure him over the huge size of the Roman army—'in all that number, there's not one named Gisco'—and a jest about the enemy cavalry's ineptitude in dismounting to fight. In real life, moreover, Maharbal may yet again have urged a march on Rome and (yet again?) been recorded doing so by someone like Silenus. Thus to Coelius, Maharbal's *mot* might well seem suitable in this context, with the unsuitability of *diequinti* overlooked in the higher interests of drama.[10]

In Gellius' extract Coelius is content to take over and expand Cato's version. Cato leaves the reader to deduce that the cavalryman means that the rest of the army should follow; Coelius painstakingly supplies that detail. Similarly he makes Maharbal the promised provider of Hannibal's dinner. Now Cato's sequel survives elsewhere in Gellius:

deinde dictator iubet postridie magistrum equitum arcessi: 'Mittam te, si vis, cum equitibus.' 'Sero est' inquit magister equitum, 'iam rescivere.'

This snippet we owe again to Gellius' interest in words, here *rescire*. So in Cato's version, and conceivably in real life, Hannibal actually changed his mind next day—only for his cavalry commander to knock him back with a blunt comment ('it's too late, they've already found out'). Coelius is likelier to have reproduced this, in rhetorical dressing, than to have devised an early version of Livy's *vincere scis* epigram. Livy reverses the order of Maharbal's points to Hannibal, incorporates a rhetorical antithesis (*ut prius venisse quam venturum sciant*) and imports *epulaberis*—fancier and yet more concise—to replace the homely *curabo tibi cena sit cocta*. He has not a trace of the general's change of mind. Livy then is the likely begetter of the famous epigram.

But that Maharbal memorably urged his general to strike fast and decisively at the City to win the war, and in 217, ought to be accepted. It may have been the most spectacular example of ignored wisdom in ancient history.[11]

University of Sydney DEXTER HOYOS
dexter.hoyos@antiquity.usyd.edu.au

[10] On Coelius and his work cf. E. Badian in T. A. Dorey (ed.), *Latin Historians* (London, 1966), 15–17; W. Herrmann, *Die Historien des L. Coelius Antipater* (Meisenheim-Glan, 1979); C. W. Fornara, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1983), 55, 59; M. W. Frederiksen in N. Purcell (ed.), *Campania* (Rome, 1984), 255; Seibert, *Forschungen* (n. 1), 29–30, 184–5, 188–90, 238–40. Cannae anecdotes: Plutarch, *Fabius* 15 (Gisco); Livy 22.49.3 (Roman cavalry—*quam mallem, vinctos mihi traderet*) and Plutarch, ibid., 16.

[11] Cato, fr. 87P = Gell. 2.19.9. The order of Livy's points is (i) you shall banquet, (ii) 'you follow', (iii) cavalry to go first—that is the proposed actions in reverse order, no doubt for vividness. On the soundness of a march on Rome, at any rate after Cannae, cf. B. D. Hoyos, *G&R* 30 (1983), 177–8; Seibert, *Hannibal* (n. 1), 200–1. The author greatly appreciates the constructive comments of the reader and the Editor.